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ABSTRACT
Fetal surgery has been practised for some decades now.
However, it remains a highly complex area, both
medically and ethically. This paper shows how the
routine use of ultrasound has been a catalyst for fetal
surgery, in creating new needs and new incentives for
intervention. Some of the needs met by fetal surgery are
those of parents and clinicians who experience stress
while waiting for the birth of a fetus with known
anomalies. The paper suggests that the role of
technology and visualisation techniques in creating and
meeting such new needs is ethically problematic. It then
addresses the idea that fetal surgery should be restricted
to interventions that are life-saving for the fetus, arguing
that this restriction is unduly paternalistic. Fetal surgery
poses challenges for an autonomy-based system of
ethics. However, it is risky to circumvent these
challenges by restricting the choices open to pregnant
women, even when these choices appear excessively
altruistic.
Fetal surgery was pioneered in the 1980s by
Dr Michael Harrison ‘the father of fetal surgery’ at
the University of San Francisco, California Chil-
dren’s Hospital.
1 2 Since Harrison began his work,
others have taken up the challenge, and fetal
treatment centres are now in operation in Phila-
delphia, Boston, Cincinnati and Texas to name just
a few. Fetal surgery has also become a reality in the
UK. Figures given by Lord Darzi in a recent
parliamentary debate indicate that 192 operations
were performed on fetuses in the UK between 2006
and 2007.
3
Fetal surgery can be carried out with varying
degrees of invasiveness. Open surgery involves
making an incision in the mother’s abdomen and
lifting out the uterus. An incision is then made in
the uterus to expose as much of the fetus as is
necessary to perform the surgery. The fetus remains
connected to the placenta throughout the proce-
dure. When surgery is completed, the fetus is
returned to the uterus, the incision is sutured, the
uterus is replaced in the abdomen, and the
abdominal incision is closed.
Other less invasive options include endoscopic
techniques and percutaneous procedures. Doyal
and Ward,
4 writing on this subject in 1998,
suggested that the endoscopic and percutaneous
approaches would be likely to supplant the more
invasive open fetal surgery. However, to date this
has not been the case. All types of fetal surgery are
still being practised and advertised in the various
US centres listed above.
There are two primary ethical issues that I want
to explore in this context. One is the transition
from imaging to intervention. While ultrasound is
a non-invasive method of visualising a fetus, its
routine use as a method of ‘reassuring’ pregnant
women has in fact been a catalyst for the devel-
opment of fetal surgery.
5 This calls into question
the apparently neutral status of imaging technol-
ogies. It also requires a consideration of the harms
and beneﬁts of interventions that result from the
development of such technologies.
The second issue I will discuss is the way
that fetal surgery challenges autonomy-focussed
approaches to medical ethics. Doyal and Ward
4
suggest that women’s autonomy may be threat-
ened if fetuses are regarded as patients in their own
right. Yet they, and a number of clinicians, suggest
restricting access to fetal surgery on paternalistic
grounds, which also present a threat to women’s
autonomy.
IMAGING LEADS TO INTERVENTION
In the past, mothers and clinicians spent the
9 months of pregnancy in more or less blissful
ignorance of what was happening inside the womb.
The development of ultrasound has dramatically
altered this. Ultrasound was ﬁrst used in obstetrics
in the late 1950s, and it quickly became apparent
that it could be used to track an entire pregnancy.
There was an upsurge in the use of the technique,
and it has now become part of the routine
management of pregnancy.
6
Initially, ultrasound simply provided a basic
image of the fetus, allowing clinicians to identify,
for example, whether it was in the breach position.
However, as techniques became more sophisticated,
a range of diagnostic possibilities emerged. Visual-
ising a fetus may reveal its gender, whether it is
likely to have Down syndrome, and whether the
umbilical cord is threatening its circulation. Is this
a change for the better? Ultrasound is often
described as offering reassurance to mothers, but
this is likely to be the case only if the fetus is
deemed normal. It is precisely because ultrasound
has the capacity to identify abnormalities that it is
used in medicine.
7 8
As soon as it becomes feasible to identify
anomalies at the prenatal stage, questions are raised
about what can and what should be done. The urge
to intervene is a natural corollary of the ability to
present a problem in a way that preserves its visual
immediacy. People feel differently about things
they can see from the way they feel about things
they merely know.
9 10 Feeling differently means
that one is likely to act differently. A powerful
example of this is the Ethiopian famine in the
1980s, and the UK’s response to it. Many people in
the UK knew that people were starving in Ethiopia.
But when pictures of the famine were aired, when
the suffering of the people who we had previously
known about only in the abstract, became visible,
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Ethicsthere was a sudden upsurge in public response. As we could see,
we now felt obliged to act.
11 12
Ultrasound technology has made the fetus visible and created
a corresponding urge to intervene. It is for this reason that it is
important to recognise the connection between fetal surgery
and ultrasound, but also the more general connection between
the acquisition of data and the compulsion to act on that data.
So although an imaging technology may in isolation be
a non-invasive means of observation, it may become part of
a technological process that results in increased interventions.
The question then to be asked is whether this systematic process
of increased surveillance, diagnosis and intervention is beneﬁcial,
and if so, to whom?
WHO BENEFITS FROM FETAL SURGERY?
The most obvious beneﬁciaries of fetal surgery are the fetuses
that are diagnosed and treated in utero, and I will discuss this
shortly. However, it is important to note that fetal surgery may
also serve the interests of people other than the fetus. Parents
and clinicians may have something to gain from fetal inter-
ventions. It could be argued that these beneﬁts are vicariousd
that clinicians and parents beneﬁt only insofar as the fetus does.
However, there are additional ways in which parents and clini-
cians may beneﬁt, which are not simply derived from the effects
on the fetus. Doyal and Ward
4 note the advantages that may
accrue to clinicians who make a name for themselves in this
pioneering area. Careers can be made and reputations built.
There is not scope in this paper to explore the ethics of profes-
sional self-interest in this context, but Doyal and Ward
4 are
certainly right to identify the existence of such interests.
Beneﬁts to parents and clinicians may also be derived from the
fact that surgery offers a course of actionddoing, rather than
simply waiting. As I have suggested, it may be difﬁcult to
maintain a non-interventionist attitude to problems that have
been identiﬁed, especially if they have been made visible. Having
to wait for the birth before intervening is frustrating. There is
evidence to suggest that acting is psychologically easier than
simply waiting in a number of contexts. Interestingly, this is
true regardless of how successful the act may be. For example,
among patients waiting for heart surgery, the waiting itself is
a signiﬁcant cause of psychological distress, independently of
any symptom-based factors or speciﬁc fears of outcomes being
worsened by the passage of time. Rather, it is the waiting in and
of itself that is psychologically harmful.
13 14
Of course, it might be argued that patients awaiting surgery
are likely to be anxious anyway. The looming prospect of
surgery together with the existence of a known medical problem
may be stressful. Prospective parents, on the other hand, may be
apprehensive about what the future holds, but are not neces-
sarily ill themselves. Therefore, it might be thought that the
analogy does not hold, and that the anxiety experienced by
patients waiting for treatment is linked speciﬁcally with their
underlying medical condition. However, research indicates that
waiting for surgery for someone else is also highly psychologi-
cally distressing, for example in the case of spouses of patients
with heart problems,
15 and also in the case of men whose
partners are waiting for in-vitro fertilisation treatment.
16 The
stress of waiting for treatment is not speciﬁcally linked to the
person who has the illness, but is shared between all those who
may be affected by the outcome of the anticipated event.
The psychological difﬁculty of waiting for the birth of
a fetus with known medical problems is a source of distress to
parentsdand health professionals too. Turning this around,
regardless of whether fetal surgery beneﬁts the fetus, it may
provide a means of resolving the psychological stress caused by
the anxiety of waiting until the birth. This raises some inter-
esting ethical issues. I have argued that the psychological
distress of parents and clinicians partly constitutes the ‘need’ for
intervention, but this need in itself is derived from the routine
use of the diagnostic technology. That is to say, the use of
ultrasound creates new needs that it, in turn, provides the
means of fulﬁlling. If parents and clinicians did not see the
images, their need for the psychological comfort of surgical
intervention would not arise.
It is often assumed that medical progress and the develop-
ment of new medical technologies necessarily serve to reduce the
sum of human need, but there is another way of looking at this:
technology identiﬁes new problems, which in turn generate new
needs that must be met through further developments in
medical technology. According to bioethicist Daniel Callahan,
17
this constitutes an ongoing cycle, or arms race. He believes that
this endless push towards further technologies and interventions
places a strain on resources that may ultimately serve to increase
suffering rather than diminish it.
I would suggest that Callahan
17 is right to recognise the role
of new technologies in creating new medical needs. Fetal surgery
is a medical intervention whose function is, at least partly, to
relieve the psychological stress that adverse ultrasound ﬁndings
cause to parents and clinicians. Once the technology has been
developed, however, it is very hard to suggest that it should be
disregarded, or that the individuals who might seek to use it
should be prevented from doing so. For this reason, I will not go
further into Callahan’s argument here. In the next section, I will
focus on the ethical management of fetal surgery in the context
of individuals who may be directly affected by it.
BENEFITS FOR THE FETUS AND RISKS FOR MOTHERS
The motivations for fetal surgery that I have discussed above
apply to parents and clinicians, but what are the advantages, if
any, for the fetus in being operated upon while still in utero?
There are some medical problems that, without surgery, will
almost inevitably cause the death of the fetus before, or shortly
after, birth. Among the conditions that might fall into this
category are congenital diaphragmatic hernia, in which the
abdominal organs protrude into the chest, impeding lung
development.
18 Teratomas that develop at the base of the coccyx
are also highly risky for fetuses, as they can grow so large as to
place a strain on the heart. When this has happened, surgery
may be the only way of preserving the life of the fetus.
19
These beneﬁts come at a cost to the mother. Open fetal
surgery involves two Caesarean sections for the womandthe
ﬁrst at the time of the fetal intervention, the second at the time
the baby is born. There is a risk of rupturing the uterus. Mothers
will need to spend 5e7 days in hospital.
20 Any future children
will have to be delivered by Caesarean. Open fetal surgery
very frequently involves premature labour and deliverydon
average babies are born approximately 8 weeks after surgery.
Mean gestational age at delivery according to one study
was 32.5 weeks.
20 The risks of endoscopic and percutaneous
procedures are lower, but still signiﬁcant.
Doyal and Ward
4 argue that only the most serious conditions
can justify fetal surgery. A similar stance is adopted by many of
the clinicians involved in this kind of surgery. The risks imposed
on women whose fetuses undergo surgery are thought to be
justiﬁed only if the life of the fetus is in danger. This might seem
to offer a relatively straightforward ethical blueprint for the
management of fetal surgery. Other conditionsdnon-lethal
tumours, for example, or cleft palatedcould be addressed after
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Ethicsthe birth of the child without going through the mother, as it
were. However, if we are to countenance fetal surgery at all,
why should we restrict it to conditions that are life-threatening
to the fetus? The obvious answer is: to protect mothers. Women
should not have to undergo surgery unless it is absolutely necessary.
Yet who should be charged with making this judgement as to
whether the risks to women are acceptable in balance against
the beneﬁts to the fetus? Should it be women themselves, or
their clinicians? There are in fact some persuasive arguments in
favour of fetal surgery for non-life-threatening conditions. If
a problem has been identiﬁed by ultrasound, fetal surgery may
offer the possibility of remedying the condition there and then
without the need for postnatal intervention. Giving birth to
a healthy child and taking it home straight away might seem
more appealing than having a birth followed by surgery and
uncertainty.
Still more signiﬁcantly, the uterine environment promotes
quicker healing with less scar tissue. Women may be eager to
secure this beneﬁt for their child even if its life is not at risk.
When defects such as cleft palate or teratoma have been diag-
nosed prenatally, scarless fetal surgery will be a major advantage
over postnatal treatment. It is plausible that some patients
might want to spare their offspring the risk of disﬁguring scars.
This raises the question of whether the adult’s willingness to
undergo such procedures is sufﬁcient justiﬁcation to undertake
them. It may be difﬁcult to deﬁne the circumstances under
which fetal surgery can take place without lapsing into pater-
nalism: restricting patients’ options for their own beneﬁt,
against their wishes.
MATERNAL ALTRUISM AND INFORMED CONSENT
Is it ethically acceptable to impose the risks of surgery on
someone who stands to derive no clinical beneﬁt? Surely a large
part of the answer depends on the ability to consent. Avariation
of this question has been explored by Paris and Harris
21 in the
context of operating on a twin in utero. Both twins are exposed
to the risks of surgery. Therefore, they argue that both become
patients. However, the healthy twin’s interests are not served by
being exposed to the risks of surgery. For this reason, they
conclude that it would be unethical for doctors to operate in
such circumstances. Seemingly, this argument could also apply
to the mother of the fetus(es). In fetal surgery, mother and fetus
become patients, and their interests might also seem to conﬂict
in a similar way. Yet Paris and Harris
21 do not rule out fetal
surgery entirely, only in circumstances in which a healthy twin
may be put at risk.
The difference here is that the mother has the ability to
consent to the intervention, whereas the healthy twin does not,
but Harris and Paris’
21 recognition of fetuses as patients in their
own right seems to raise some problems. Could a fetal patient’s
interests outweigh those of its mother? If so, women’s
autonomy and bodily integrity might be threatened by the
development of fetal surgery. Doyal and Ward
4 discuss the risk
of coercion in this context, arguing that women’s autonomy
should be regarded as paramount, and surgery should only ever
be performed with the mother’s informed consent. The legal
and moral status of the fetus, in their analysis, is kept within
very restricted parametersdit may be ‘special’, but its interests
are explicitly and necessarily subordinate to those of the mother.
Just as fetal surgery stretches the notion of what constitutes
a patient, so the concept of informed consent seems to have
become strangely distorted in this context. According to at least
one practitioner: ‘There will be very few patients for whom it is
an appropriate intervention [.] We are going to deal with the
unusual patient who can give an informed consent [.] These
patients are women who are carrying fetuses with life-threat-
ening conditions.’
22 Here, in a strange inversion of what one
might normally understand by the term, informed consent is
deemed valid not by virtue of the wishes and understanding of
the patient, but by virtue of the condition experienced by the
fetus. Similarly odd ideas about consent and patient choice are
implicit in the following quote: ‘The key to choosing appro-
priate patients for fetal intervention is to identify those that
would not survive with postnatal therapy alone.’
23 Here again, it
is not the mother who chooses whether to undergo the treat-
ment. Rather, the medical establishment chooses her as an
acceptable vehicle through which the treatment can be offered.
It is no longer clear here just what role informed consent and
respect for autonomy are playing in this undoubtedly complex
ethical situation.
Although Doyal and Ward
4 take the mother’s consent to be of
fundamental importance, they too make some problematic
assumptions. Given the high rate of failure for open fetal surgery
in its early days, they suggest that the women involved must
have been inadequately informed. The implication here is that
there are some risks that no one would consent to if fully
informed, but this does not harmonise with what is known
about decisions related to reproduction and fertility. It has been
repeatedly shown that fertility patients are willing to undergo
procedures that they know to be highly unlikely to succeed and
that are risky and highly expensive. Women in this context
frequently describe themselves as having had ‘no choice’.I na n
article published in the Sunday Times, a woman who under-
went fetal surgery in the UK says ‘The only option for me was
to have the surgery’.
24
This language of compulsion is not easily assimilated into
conventional ethical frameworks centred on autonomy and
choice. This does not mean that women have been misinformed,
as Doyal and Ward
4 assume. It means that decisions made in
such situations are not based on self-protection or risk avoid-
ance. Even if the risks of fetal surgery were still greater, the
beneﬁts more marginal, and women had access to every possible
relevant fact and statistic, they might still be willing to undergo
fetal surgery. Crucially, pregnant women’s altruism is not
necessarily or ordinarily limited to life-saving interventions.
Most of the sacriﬁces that pregnant women make are designed
give the child the best start possible, rather than save its life per
se. There are conditions for which fetal surgery might offer
relatively modest beneﬁts (eg, reduced scarring) but a woman
may still wish to confer these beneﬁts on her child.
Our society expects and demands that pregnant women and
mothers should be altruistic.
25 Pregnancy itself is commonly
regarded as a state in which what would normally be super-
erogatory becomes morally required.
26 Pregnant women often
behave in ways that in any other context would be deemed
clearly supererogatorydperhaps even pathologically so. I have
argued elsewhere that the demands placed on mothers and
pregnantwomenareunreasonableandexcessive.
27Itisbecauseof
this that fetal surgery makes us uneasy, I would suggest. Expec-
tations of maternal sacriﬁce in conjunction with new techno-
logical means of intervention have led us to an uncomfortable
place.
How should we relieve this discomfort? The accepted view
seems to be that we should erect a variety of barriers that
constrain women’s options within parameters that others have
deemed reasonable. In short, a reversion to paternalism: it
cannot be safely left to pregnant women to decide. This
perpetuates and reinforces the idea that pregnant women are so
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their own interests. In essence, because our ideas of maternal
altruism do not ﬁt into an autonomy-based ethics system, we
are tempted to exclude pregnant women from their place in that
system by a system of paternalistic restrictions. The paternal-
istic nature of these restrictions is often masked by their
apparently clinical rationale. Laura Purdy
28 has demonstrated
the level to which paternalistic assumptions inﬁltrate arguments
related to selective reductiondanother facet of fetal surgery.
Perhaps this encroachment of paternalism is a subversion of
medical ethics on a greater scale than the problem that it is
attempting to solve. A better approach might be to look to the
social world in which women’s freedom to make choices is
formed. It is a mistake here to suppose that non-pregnant
women, and men, are perfectly free in their choices and deci-
sions. Informed consent is always and necessarily constrained by
social expectations and values. It is always likely to be imperfect,
but if we feel that social pressures are coming to bear too heavily
on a particular area of decision-making, there may be an
opportunity to reconsider and question that social pressure,
rather than hastening towards the refuge of paternalism.
The spectacle of a woman undergoing open fetal surgery is
undoubtedly disturbing. It illustrates in the most graphic way
the collision of two highly problematical assumptions: ﬁrst, that
ever-greater surveillance of pregnancy is beneﬁcial, or at least not
harmful, and second, that pregnant women should sacriﬁce their
bodily integrity for the welfare of their child.
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